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The emergence of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) has signaled a major reshaping of the 
world’s economy: financial actors from developing countries playing on an equal footing 
with the financial giants of OECD countries. Rising financial centers such as Singapore, 
Dubai or Shanghai have nurtured leading financial institutional and asset managers 
independent of the traditional Western financial centers of New York, Boston or London. 
 
Beyond this spectacular emergence also lies promising news for the wealth of (developing) 
nations. Sovereign wealth funds may grow to become major actors of development finance: 
Sovereign Development Funds. Should SWFs allocate 10% of their portfolio to other 
emerging and developing economies over the next decade, this could generate inflows of 
USD 1 400 billion: a yearly amount higher than all OECD countries development aid put 
together. 
 
The international investment of sovereign funds is already increasing. If domestically, some 
sovereign wealth funds tend to behave as development finance institutions, working to 
boost economic diversification or build strong national champions, in their international 
investment strategies their behavior resembles traditional investment funds, seeking 
performance and solid returns.  
 
This article will first discuss the emergence of these institutions (which are not totally new) 
and follow by assessing their potential impact in other emerging markets. We conclude by 
arguing that sovereign funds, because of their origins (emerging economies for most of 
them) and their potential (or already effective) re-positioning towards emerging markets 
could usefully be considered as Sovereign Development Funds (SDF). 
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Fig.1: Emerging and developing countries’ 
contribution to global output growth  
 
 
Source: OECD Development Centre, 2008; based on IMF data 
 
 
Fig.2: Emerging markets’ share of world  outward FDI 
 
 
Source: OECD Development Centre, 2008; based on UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report 2007.  
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Shifting Wealth of Nations. 
 
 
Through the emergence of sovereign wealth funds, we are witnessing a major rebalancing 
of the wealth of nations. In this sense, therefore, SWFs are part of a broader narrative, a 
tectonic shift to which “decoupling”, a popular buzzword in the financial markets over 2007 
describing asymmetries of growth patterns experienced by OECD economies versus 
emerging ones (for a discussion see for example Pimco, 2008), does little justice. 
Decoupling belongs in fact to a world that is already disappearing, one where a Periphery 
splits from a Centre. In fact, the real issue is that the Centre is less and less the Centre and 
the Periphery less and less the Periphery. Classifications such as OECD / emerging 
economies have grown to reflect historical baggage more than economic reality: Mexico, 
South Korea or Turkey, three leading emerging markets, are already OECD members; still 
others, such as Chile or Russia, are on accession track. 
  
World growth today is no longer driven by OECD countries but from emerging ones (see 
Figure 1). OECD countries, which five decades ago concentrated 75% of world GDP, today 
account for less than 55% of global wealth. The U.S. stock market accounts for 35% and 
falling of world market capitalization, from 50% just 10 years ago. In 2007, the share of 
foreign direct investment from OECD countries decreased to 85%, from nearly 100% in 
1970 (see Figure 2). The same year, for the first time, emerging markets economies traded 
more between each other than with OECD countries, illustrating the major “shifting of 
fortunes” and south-south financial recycling of new wealth derived from the commodity 
bonanza (see HSBC, 2008). 
 
This tectonic shift is particularly striking with regards emerging world corporations. Just to 
name some few Latin examples, a company like ImBev, born from the merger of Belgian 
and Brazilian brewers, is already an exotic bird representative of these new global emerging 
corporations: difficult to classify in either emerging market or OECD asset class. Cemex, the 
Mexican cement giant, is still headquartered in Monterrey but its strategic, financial and 
economic research centers are located in Spain. The profile of the Brazilian mining 
conglomerate Vale has already changed with the acquisition of Inco from Canada, and the 
pending deal on Swiss-based Xstrata should complete its transformation into a major global 
player. Brazil is growing into a global trader, reaching into exotic markets like the Middle 
East, Africa or South East Asia. Companies like Vale, Petrobras or Odebrecht are entering 






Fig.4: Comparative levels of GDP 
Billion, 1990 USD 
 
 
Source: OECD Development Centre, 2008; based on 
Maddison, 2008 
China1. These emerging global multilatinas, with headquarters in Latin America, are 
following a trend that includes India, China, Russia or South Africa based companies, to 
name but the largest. It is ironical, to see a company like Tata, emerging from India, to buy 
the jewels of the old Empire, acquiring one after another, Corus, Jaguar and Rolls Royce. 
The Periphery is entering massively into the Centre. 
 
Of course, emerging markets were not always on the periphery of the world economy: in 
many cases it would be more accurate to talk about re-emerging rather than emerging 
markets. China is probably the most spectacular case in point: till the mid-nineteenth 
century, it represented over 30% of world GDP, gradually slipping over the following 
hundred years (in 1950 dropping to less than 5% of world GDP - see Figure 3). In other 
words, not everything is new under the sun, China is re-assuming a leading role in terms of 
weight in the world economy, the big difference between then and now is that this re-
emergence is taking place in a very different way, China being much more open and 
plugged into the world economy that it has been ever been before. According to Angus 
Maddison’s calculations, in a recent book published by the OECD Development Centre2, 
China will regain its place as the first world economy in terms of GDP by 2015 (see Figure 
4). The recent revision of World Bank PPP data notwithstanding, China is poised to reclaim 
its place as the world’s largest economy over the next half century.  
 
What is true for China is also valid for other emerging economies, particularly India that 
also weighed heavily in the world economy until the late XIXth Century and is now also re-
emerging (see Figure 5). These Asian Drivers are today impacting the entire developing 
world (see Avendaño, Reisen, and Santiso, 2008), as much as developed economies, 
becoming net exporters of capital to the global economy. In 2007, China was responsible 
for more than 20% of world net capital exports, ahead of Japan and Germany. This trend is 
set to persist: According to the IMF, Chinese cumulative net capital exports will amount to 
USD 3.4 trillion in 2008-2013.  
 
Thus, one of the major events in international economics over the past decade has been 
emerging countries’ shift from net foreign debt to net foreign asset positions, what El-Erian 
labelled the transition from “debtor regime” to “creditor regime” (El-Erian, 2008; see also 
on this issue Pimco, 2007a). As estimated by Summers (2008), the aggregate level of 
central bank reserves alone for developing countries in excess of short term debt (if we 
apply the known “Greenspan Guidotti” rule that suggests that a healthy level of reserves is 
                                                 
1 On emerging multinationals and on Latin American ones see in particular Javier Santiso, “La 
emergencia de las mltilatinas”, Revista de la CEPAL, August 2008b, 95, pp. 7-30. See also Javier Santiso, 
“The emergence of Latin multinationals”, Deutsche Bank Research, Current Issues, March 2007.  
2 See Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run - Second Edition, Paris, OECD 
Development Centre, 2008. 
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enough to cover one year of short term debt3) was reaching USD 2 trillion by the end of 
2006 and has been increasing yearly by USD 500 billion since the early 2000s. To place this 
all in context, emerging markets hold reserves roughly equivalent to 20% of GDP, 
compared to a paltry 0,5% for the US (Figure 6). In absolute values China and Russia lead 
the ranking of emerging markets holders of reserves in excess of short term debt in terms 
of absolute values (Figure 7). African countries like Libya and Algeria lead in terms of GDP. 
 
In terms of capital flows, in 2007 emerging markets received a record USD 953 billion, 
while outflows were USD 1,600 billion – about four and six times their respective 2000 
levels. Emerging multinationals multiplied foreign acquisitions, notably in OECD economies, 
while central banks and other public or private asset managers bought into stocks and 
bonds in Western countries. In 2007 alone, of the USD 920 billion that foreigners pumped 
into US stock markets, bonds and government securities, a stunning 39% (more than USD 
360 billion) came from emerging markets economies, according to calculations from Bank of 
America based on US Treasury Department data4. This a low estimate and likely only the tip 
of the iceberg, as such estimations do not include most Gulf investments flowing to New 
York through London trading platforms and asset managers. 
 
This explosion of investment activity (figure 8) is testimony to developing countries’ better 
and wiser stewardship of their national wealth. It is this process that has seen countries 
channelling their (often commodity-related) revenues through SWF or similar institutions, 
establishing endowment funds for social, economic and financial consolidation. With this 
newfound financial clout, emerging countries, once passive recipients of foreign portfolio 
investors, have become active and significant players in international financial markets, 
their asset allocation increasingly scrutinized due to their growing impacts on currency or 
equity markets.  
 
The Reserve Federal Board recently underlined that the extent to which SWF involvement 
conveys a positive signal to market participants about a target firm: based on the analysis 
of 163 investment announcements, research showed an average positive risk-adjusted 
return of more than 2 percent for target firms over the two days surrounding SWF 
acquisition announcements5. Fotak, et al (2008) assesses the financial impact of SWFs 
                                                 
3 On this rule and for a discussion see Pimco, 2007b. There is a large literature discussing the 
appropriate level of reserves by emerging economies. See in particular Aizeman, 2007; and for a 
discussion Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil, 2008). 
4 Data quoted by the Wall Street Journal, June 28th 2008, p. 11. 
5 See Jason Kutter and Ugur Lel, “Friends or Foes? The stock market impact of sovereign wealth fund 
investments and the price of keeping secrets”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
International Finance Discussion Papers, 940, August 2008.  
See also http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2008/940/ifdp940.pdf 
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investments in the stock markets6. They find a significantly positive mean abnormal return 
upon SWF acquisitions of equity stakes in publicly traded companies around the world. Also, 
evidence shows that equity acquisitions by SWFs are followed by deteriorating firm 
performance. The authors conclude that SWFs might act as monitors, improving 
governance and profitability on the firms where they invest, while at the same time 
following the principles of profit maximization. Similarly, Balding (2008) studies portfolio 
investments for a group of SWFs and concludes that they act as economic driven investors, 
and their impact on international financial markets may be more moderate than expected7.  
 
SWF are not the only institutions managing these nations’ wealth. Central Banks manage 
reserves but with a prudential and risk averse approach, aligning objectives with national 
monetary and fiscal policies. Finance ministries also manage national wealth through 
Treasury and debt management divisions, operations bounded by government budgeting 
and civil service compensation. For governments therefore, the most flexible and innovative 
institutions are sovereign funds. Sometimes these answer to traditional institutions such as 
Finance Ministries or Central Banks – like in the cases of Chile or Norway (see on Chile, 
Parrado, 2008; on Norway Eriksen, 2008). However, in some cases new institutions were 
created from scratch to manage the fund: New Zealand, Korea, and above all Singapore, 
China or the Middle East.  
 
In all cases, the primary stated objective of SWFs is to provide inter-temporal stabilization, 
diversification and risk adjusted investment for nation’s wealth (Kern, 2007). On average 
their asset allocation is split between fixed income securities (35-49%), equity securities in 
listed corporations (50-55%) and the remaining (8-10%) in alternative investments such as 
hedge funds, private equity companies or other products (Fernández and Eschweiler, 2008). 
This is an average estimation and obviously strategies diverge importantly between 
institutions. In the case of Norway, equities accounted in 2007 for 40% of the fund’s 
strategic benchmark portfolio and consisted mainly in Europe-listed equities (50%), 
Americas and Africa (35% and Asia/Oceania (15%). Fixed income accounted for the 
remaining 60%, denominated mostly in currencies from Europe (60%), Americas and/Africa 
(35%) and Asia/Oceania (5%) (Kjaer, 2008). In the case of the National Oil Fund of 
Kazakhstan, inspired by Norway’s experience, assets were split into stabilisation and savings 
portfolios. The stabilisation portfolio has been mainly invested in high liquid money market 
instruments while the savings portfolio has been invested mostly in fixed income 
instruments (75%) but also equities (25%) (Sartbayev, Izabasarov, 2008).  
 
                                                 
6See Fotak, V., Bortolotti, B., Megginson, W. “The Financial Impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investments in Listed Companies”. Mimeo University of Oklahoma. June 2008. 
 
7 Balding, Ch. “A Portfolio Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Funds”. Mimeo University of California, Irvine. 
June 2008. 












In general SWFs have been funded in various ways: from central bank reserves (China and 
Singapore for example); the export of state-owned resources (Botswana, Chile, Abu Dhabi, 
or Kuwait); taxation of exports (Russia, Alaska); fiscal surpluses (Korea or New Zealand for 
example); or from privatization receipts (Malaysia or Australia). Whatever their origins, 
objectives or funding, the SWF model is not new, even if their number has increased 
sharply over recent years8. It is estimated that 35% of all SWFs were established over the 
past five years. However, some are far older, investing since the 1960s and 1970s and by 
now extremely diversified (see González Cid, 2008). The Kuwait Investment Authority, for 
example, the oldest, was created in 1953, Singapore’s Temasek Holdings in 1970, the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) in 1978. Singapore, with a powerful export base but a 
relatively small economy, was one of the very first in Asia to create a fund, establishing 
Temasek in 1974 and then the Government Investment Corporation of Singapore (GIC) in 
1981, with the aim of increasing the return on investment of its external surpluses by 
targeting international portfolio investments since the very inception. It was the commodity 
boom of the 2000s and the rise of emerging markets economies which boosted the new 
wave of SWF creation, with China, Russia and Dubai creating their own sovereign wealth 
management institutions.  
 
These institutions have often been key in helping navigate the dangers faced by resource-
rich countries, helping to diversify their economic base through international portfolio 
diversification and foreign currency sterilization. In OECD countries, Norway, through the 
Government Pension Fund (formerly the Petroleum Fund), has been one of the most 
successful examples of this strategy. Similar oil funds in Kazakhstan or the Pula Fund from 
Botswana are other examples of SWF looking to invest their wealth in asset classes outside 
the commodity cluster in order to reduce the macroeconomic exposure of their countries to 
commodity fluctuations (oil and gas in the case of Kazakhstan, diamonds in the case of 
Botswana). In the Gulf, a number of private equity firms, funded partly or totally by 
sovereign wealth stemming from the oil bonanza, were also established in the 2000s, 
following the creation in the 1970s and 1980s of the very first wave of Gulf SWFs.  
                                                 
8 SWF are not new neither the sole large publicly-held pools of assets that are playing an increasingly 
prominent role in the global investment arena. For a comparison of distinct forms of such public funds, 
namely foreign exchange reserve funds, sovereign wealth funds, and public pension funds, see Olivia S. 
Mitchell, John Piggott, and Cagri Kumru, “Managing Public Investment Funds: Best Practices and New 
Challenges”, NBER Working Paper, June 2008, No. 14078. The red light between SWFs and pension 
funds is not always obvious as underlined by Truman’s scoreboard exercises that list a total of 56 
sovereign wealth funds in 38 countries (Truman, 2008). In the same way, if sovereign wealth funds are 
linked to state or official assets, a lot of other governments around the world hold significant stakes in 
listed companies: France, for example, tops the rankings and holds listed equities valued at USD 280 
billion, ahead of Russia that is second with nearly USD 250 billion (Balding, 2008). 
Fig.8: Sovereign Wealth Fund investment 
 
 








The largest SWFs, from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and China, have already reached 
a scale in line with the largest global asset managers or the biggest hedge funds and 
private equity firms. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) holds around USD 875 
billion of assets under management, a size approaching Barclays Global Investors’ volumes 
under management (USD 1 815 billion) or State Street Global Advisors (USD 1 750 billion), 
two of the world largest OECD-based asset managers (see Figure 9 - see also for other 
comparisons City of London, 2008).  
 
 
On a more aggregate level, the size of the assets managed by SWFs from emerging 
markets is impressive: by the end of 2007, these new power brokers had amassed more 
than USD 3,1 billion, according to Morgan Stanley (Morgan Stanley, 2007; see also Jen, 
2007). Emerging world sovereign states were estimated to hold USD 7 trillion in 
international reserves at end 2007 (IMF, 2008) and a further USD 2-3 trillion in SWF assets 
(see annex 1 for estimates of SWF assets). IMF projections consider that SWF assets under 
management could surpass USD 10 trillion by 2013, while Morgan Stanley projects that they 
will surpass official reserves and Standard Chartered that they will reach over USD 13 
trillion over the next decade (Lyons, 2007).  
 
Fig.9: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Financial Institutions 
Total assets, USD billion, 2007 
 
 
Source: OECD Development Centre, 2008; based on OECD, JP Morgan,  
Deutsche Bank, IFSL, 2008.  
Fig.10: Sovereign funds’ assets in perspective 
USD, trillion, 2005 
 
 
Source: OECD Development Centre, 2008; based on Deutsche Bank, 






Although SWF holdings represent less than 2 percent of the world’s USD 167 000 billion of 
financial assets, accounting for just 1.3 per cent of the world’s stock of financial assets 
(stocks, bonds and ban deposits). Their size, in terms of assets, is lower than global 
reserves, pension funds assets or bank assets (see Figure 10 above). If we take as a 
reference the U.S. GDP, around USD 12 trillion in 2008, or again the total value of traded 
securities (debt and equity) denominated in U.S. dollars, estimated to be more than USD 50 
trillion in 2008, the size of all assets managed by SWF is relatively modest. 
  
This is however still more than the sums invested by hedge funds the private equity 
industry. If their growth trends maintained their current pace, they could reach USD 17 000 
billion over the next decade according to Morgan Stanley, reaching over 5% of total global 
financial wealth. But above all, these financial actors represent already important players if 
we compare with the emerging markets asset class. They already concentrate assets 
equivalent to the total value of traded securities in Africa, the Middle East, and emerging 
Europe combined (about USD 4 trillion in 2008); or, taking another comparison, roughly the 
size of all of Latin American markets. Whatever the projections and numbers, these actors 
will be key drivers in the future of international finance, especially from an emerging 
markets perspective.  
 
From the point of view of developing and emerging countries, the major question is how to 
invest this newfound wealth to their nation’s greatest profit? Is it wise, for instance, to 
continue investing in OECD countries, where returns are low and the risks not as low as 
expected (a lesson painfully learnt with the US banking meltdown)? Or should these funds 
rather look to diversify towards other markets, emerging ones in particular? The question is 
already in the minds of many economists, such as Lawrence Summers, who asks whether it 
is financially responsible to invest accumulated reserve assets only in short-term liquid 
securities of industrial countries9 (see also on the importance of this issue of asset allocation 
in Rozanov, 2006 and 2008). Some of the leading and more sophisticated SWFs such as 
Dubai International Capital, ADIA or Temasek, have been already diversifying actively 
towards other emerging markets regions, above all in Asia, Middle east and North Africa. 
This indicates what is maybe sovereign wealth funds’ major characteristic: to be 
development finance institutions from (and in) emerging markets.  
 
The question is a key one for emerging and developing countries. As underlined by 
Summers (2008) in a very interesting simulation, the typical central bank portfolio, 
considering a risk-averse investment in a 0-3 years dollar denominated US Treasury, has 
earned 1% in real terms over the past 60 years. If we apply the same exercise for a more 
diversified portfolio (60% stocks and 40% bonds), the earnings could reach 6% and with 
an entire portfolio allocated to stocks, 7% (Figure 11). Bearing in mind that the endowment 
of a typical top-tier university in the US over the past two decades has been earning returns 
approaching 10%, it is clear that there is room of manoeuvre and the potential of higher 
                                                 
9 See Lawrence Summers, “Opportunities in an era of large and growing official wealth”, in Jennifer 
Johnson-Calari and Malan Rietveld, eds., Sovereign wealth management, London, Central Banking 
Publications, 2008, pp. 15-28. 
Fig.11: Annualised risk/return of investment portfolios, 1926-2004 




100% US 1-month deposits 0.65% 0.89%
Typical central bank portfolio 0.98% 1.24%
Typical pension portfolio 5.75% 12.45%
100% US stocks 7.11% 19.37%








risk adjusted earnings for developing countries’ wealth is pretty large. It we consider the 
figure of USD 2 trillion of excess reserves mentioned previously and we apply a 5% return, 
the cost for wealth management institutions of emerging and developing countries not to 
diversify their portfolio holdings away from classical US Treasuries or stocks, can reach 
more than USD 100 billion, that is 1% of the GDP of all developing countries or, putting it in 
another way, an amount equivalent to the annual ODA (Official Development Aid) that 
OECD countries are putting into those same developing countries. 
 
Norway’s fund, one of the most sophisticated SWFs, decided to transfer assets from one 
asset class (petroleum) into more broadly diversified portfolio including equities and fixed 
income from both developed and developing countries. As stressed by a former manager of 
the fund, the return on a dollar invested in oil in 1900 is worth 2 dollars in 2005 while the 
same dollar invested in equities is worth 376 dollars and the value for fixed income 
instruments almost 6 dollars (Kjaer, 2008). The decision of asset allocation, and 
subsequently the benchmarks for the portfolio, is probably one of the most important ones 







Sovereign Development Funds in Emerging Markets. 
 
 
Sovereign funds have been grabbing the headlines of western newspapers. The debate 
continues as to their potential global financial impact and their investment policies. 
Strangely, however, the development dimension is missing from the debates10.  
 
This is a striking omission as sovereign funds are major actors arising precisely from 
emerging and developing countries. Beyond their spectacular emergence, however, lies 
promising news for the wealth of (developing) nations: sovereign wealth funds are (or at 
the very least, will become) major actors of development finance, not only domestically, but 
also abroad in other emerging countries. In this perspective, sovereign funds could well 
grow to become Sovereign Development Funds. 
 
Firstly, SWFs are, for the most part, emerging market institutions. Only 15% of them are 
from OECD and developed countries. The majority (75%) are from the Middle East and Asia 
(see Figure 12). They are key engines of development finance within their homelands, 
some very explicitly involved in national strategies of industrial diversification. This is the 
case of Malaysia’s Khazanah, which is actively involved in financing long term projects and 
infrastructures throughout the country (Radhi, 2008). The same applies for Kazyna, one of 
Kazakhstan’s SWFs, mandated to promote innovative industrial projects and contribute to 
diversification toward more value added and employment-intensive industries for the oil rich 
country (Nurbek, 2008). This is also the case of their private equity arms, sophisticated 
financial institutions like Mubadala from Abu Dhabi or Istithmar from Dubai, in the Gulf – 
who consider themselves however as private investors rather than sovereign funds.  
   
Secondly and even more interestingly, SWF have not only become major development 
finance institutions in their own countries, but are also becoming major players of 
development throughout the developing world. Although recent stakes in big OECD banks 
have dominated newspaper headlines and SWF bailouts of Western financial institutions 
were indeed striking (totaling 35 billion by the end of 2007), sovereign funds’ bets on 
emerging economies are in fact equally significant. Some of SWFs’ biggest investments 
have taken place in developing countries in Asia, Africa or Latin America, with the likelihood 
of this increasing in the future. 
 
Some SWFs like, for example, Temasek Holdings of Singapore already have large stakes 
and investments in Asian companies, contributing to the development of these countries. 
Temasek holds a USD 160 billion portfolio that includes substantial chunks of India’s ICICI 
Bank and in 2007 acquired a 10 per cent stake in Tata Sky, one year after taking a 20 per 
                                                 
10 For a more conceptual approach see the note written from a development economics perspective by 
my colleague Helmut Reisen, “How to Spend it: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Wealth of Nations”, 
OECD Development Centre, Policy Insight, January 2008.  
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cent stake in China’s Misheng Banking Corp and investing in the India telecoms sector (10 
per cent stake in Tata Teleservices). All in all, Asia (excluding Singapore and Japan) already 
concentrates 40 per cent of Temasek’s portfolio, more than its total holdings in Singapore 
(38 per cent) and double those in OECD countries (20 per cent). By mid-2008, Temasek 
confirmed its ambitions to invest beyond Asia with the hiring of new head for its 
international division. While it relocated a senior manager to Sao Paolo to head the Brazil 
office, Temasek hired also a former Barclays executive to head its Mexico office as it aims 
to boost investments in Latin America, confirming its ambitions to look beyond its core 
Asian businesses. Also in Asia, the much more recently created China Investment 
Corporation is planning to allocate a significant share of its USD 200 billion fund in Asian 
and Pacific countries. Another Asian based SWF, Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB), the 
Malaysian government’s investment holding company, opened in 2008 regional offices in 
Mumbai and in Beijing as part of its efforts to seek more business avenues overseas. 
 
These bets already appear to be paying off: Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), the USD 
215 billion Middle Eastern sovereign wealth fund, has already made considerable profits on 
its USD 750 million stake in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). By mid 
2008, KIA confirmed that it intended to boost its portfolio investments in China and India 
and walk away from more investment in the US. Both the Qatar Investment Authority and 
Dubai International Capital are pursuing important investments in the Middle East and 
North Africa. In 2008 Qatar Investment Authority raised its international profile by making 
investments also in other emerging countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and agreed 
in particular to raise the percentage of its total Asian assets up to 40 per cent. One of 
ADIA’s blue chip investments (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority) is the Egyptian investment 
bank EFG Hermes (where it holds a stake of 8 per cent). Among other recent key holdings 
we also find a 39 per cent stake in Banque de Tunisie et des Emirats and many other Arab 
financial institutions. In 2007 it also made a USD 1.2 billion investment in Malaysian land 
projects. Dubai Investment Group also has stakes in North African companies like Tunisia 
Telecom (17.5 per cent). In 2008, another Abu Dhabi Government investment fund, the 
International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), and the government of Kazakhstan, 
signed an agreement to invest USD 1 billion in oil and gas projects in the Central Asian 
country. 
 
The future will bring even more investment towards emerging and developing economies. 
The European Central Bank conducted a simulation which underlined that SWFs behave 
similarly to CAPM-type investors, implying that they allocate their assets according more to 
market capitalizations rather than liquidity considerations. This would imply that more 
capital should be directed in the future towards high return emerging and developing 
countries (Beck and Fidora, 2008). It has been estimated by the IMF and Mc Kinsey Global 
Institute that SWFs from the Gulf in 2007 held 22% of their assets in Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa (IMF, 2008; Mc Kinsey, 2007). These figures are low estimates and should 
increase in the future. KIA, for example, is already cutting the portion of their portfolio 
invested in Europe and in the US to less than 70 per cent from about 90 per cent.  
 
Emerging markets in Asia (and other regions) are attracting more and more attention: in 
the end why bother to invest in low OECD growth economies when you can access nearly 
double digit growth rates in emerging countries? Certainly, as argued by the managers of 
Botswana’s sovereign fund (Pula Fund), emerging markets could be excluded because of 
their high volatility and their high dependence on commodities. Indeed, for a country like 
Botswana, rich in resources (diamonds), investing in such asset classes could reduce the 
benefits from diversification and increase exposure to commodity ups and downs (Mohohlo, 
2008). However, not all emerging markets are equal, some exhibit a high return / lower risk 
combination (in particular the investment grades ones) while not all are commodity 
dependent: precisely, in order to get higher return, without increasing commodity 
dependence, emerging markets like China, India, Mexico, Turkey or South Africa could 
become interesting targets. This is exactly what Qatar Investment Authority did in 2008 






plans to invest in South Africa. Another Gulf investor, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), 
has investments of up to USD 1.7 billion in a non resource rich country like Turkey. 
 
Dubai International Capital is willing to pursue its moves towards emerging Asia, a region 
where it intends to raise its portfolio to 30 per cent. For the moment its portfolio is 
concentrated in Europe (70 per cent), the remaining being in the Middle East. Istithmar, 
another Dubai based institution, has for the moment located the bulk of its investments in 
the Emirates (50 per cent) and the remainder in the US (27 per cent) and the UK (10 per 
cent), but is also willing to look for more opportunities in emerging countries. Mubadala, 
another Emirates-based institution created in the early 2000s in Abu Dhabi, also has a 
portfolio concentrated in the MENA region and is willing to diversify away from Western 
Europe. Dubai Investment Group is another SWF that is betting in Northern Africa with a 
recent 16 per cent stake acquired in Tunisie Telecom in 2007.   
 
This is good news for developing countries. SWFs will contribute to boost equity 
investments, injecting capital into local companies and emerging countries’ projects. They 
are building long term portfolios and will therefore contribute to reducing volatility as they 
are less subject to the constraints of more immediate returns on investments and short 
term gains that are the common stock of traditional portfolio asset managers. Most 
interestingly, because of their mandates and objectives they tend to look for secure 
investments and long-term returns. Ironically however, this has led them to invest the bulk 
in OECD countries while portfolio allocation considerations and infrastructure needs would 
suggest that they would benefit more by extending into other emerging markets regions 
such as Africa Asia and Latin America, where correlation of returns with OECD stays low 
and where infrastructure gaps are yawning. In the future, their portfolio diversification 
strategies will push them to look not only for higher return on investments but also for 
allocations less correlated with their homelands. Here probably, we will see an increasing 
interest for regions like Latin America or Africa, less correlated with those located in Asia 
and the Middle East. Africa could become an important investment playing field for all of 
them, with the promise of higher returns and less correlated investments.  
 
OECD based sovereign funds, such as Norway’s are also considering increasing their asset 
allocation towards emerging countries. In 2008, for example, Norway's almost USD 400 
billion fund declared its intention to boost emerging markets exposure, investing even in 
frontier markets such as Egypt, Morocco, or Peru. Martin Skancke, director-general at 
Norway's Ministry of Finance, declared in several official statements that the government 
fund intended to invest five percent of its equities portfolio in emerging markets, including 










Some policy implications 
 
 
The policy implications both for developed and developing countries derived from these 
emerging trends are twofold. Firstly, sovereign funds are becoming important investors 
both from and in developing and emerging countries. Sovereign funds thus contribute 
directly to development in their homelands, but also, through equity stakes or private equity 
investments in other emerging and developing countries, increasingly to development in 
many other parts of the developing world also.  
 
If Sovereign Development Funds choose to allocate, for example, 10% of their portfolio 
towards other emerging and developing economies over the next decade, this could 
generate inflows to the height of USD 1 400 billion, or, in other words, an annual amount 
superior to all OECD countries’ aid to developing economies… For donor countries 
committed to furthering global development, sovereign funds could be valuable partners for 
development finance. The current US meltdown may have precipitated this trend by 
discouraging state-run investment funds from buying further into U.S. dollar-denominated 
assets.  
 
Famously, most SWF investments made in the US over 2007 dissapointed. Since taking a 
USD 3 billion stake in U.S. private equity firm Blackstone Group in 2007 and a USD 5 billion 
stake in Morgan Stanley in 2008, China Investment Corporation, for example, has taken 
sizable losses on the value of these investments. After sinking USD 5 billion into Merrill 
Lynch when shares were trading around USD 48, Singapore's Temasek Holdings has 
watched Merrill's shares dive to about USD 30. Between august 2007 and august 2008, all 
large Sovereign Fund investments in the banking sector sustained heavy losses: Merrill 
Lynch (-62% fall in share price with massive write downs and losses amounting to nearly 
USD 52 billion), UBS (-6% and losses totaling nearly USD 40 billion), etc. 
 
Emerging and developing countries could turn out to be the unexpected winners of the 
current rebalancing, with major implications, above all in the low and middle income 
countries of Africa or South East Asia. Donors in particular should take into consideration 
this new landscape and engage discussions with these emerging development finance 
actors, not limiting dialogue to the traditional development banks, central bankers or 
ministries. One particular type of Western based institution that could usefully engage these 
funds are the so called European development finance institutions (that exist also in the US, 
Japan and other OECD countries)11 such as FMO of Netherlands, CDC Group of the UK or 
the Scandinavian Norfund, Swedfund or FinnFund. They all share long term horizon 
strategies, comparable levels of investment technologies and target both financial and 
social outcomes in a similar range of countries. Most of these institutions are owned jointly 
by public sector and private companies and hold a specific interest for long term and 
financially sustainable investments.  
 
But we should here avoid misinterpretation: SWFs are not donors, they are not pursuing 
MDGs (Millenium Development Goals) and are not held to development rhetoric or practice. 
They may act as classical development finance institutions in their homelands, and as such 
contribute to the diversification of their economies, but when investing abroad, these funds 
tend to act as much more classical private asset managers. As noted by Balding, who 
carefully analyzed their portfolios and asset allocations strategies, sovereign wealth funds 
have to date, acted as rational and economically driven investors, diversifying their portfolio 
by asset class and geographic region (Balding, 2008). They require returns, risk adjusted 
diversification and, above all, good investments. But through their investing in developing 
and emerging countries, they contribute to development: generating employment, providing 
capital for infrastructure and supplying long term money for diverse industries from 
telecoms to banking services.  
                                                 







Asking, as the World Bank President pledged in 2008, that sovereign wealth funds should 
invest 1% of their assets in Africa, is in this regard a good idea if we mean that they should 
look to that region (as they are already doing) through the eyes of investors looking for 
returns (and Africa is the kind of investment that makes sense on a purely financial level) 
and not because it follows a political pledge from a world leader or whatever other political 
consideration. Most of the Gulf sovereign wealth funds are already operating in Africa 
looking for good business and returns . This is the case also of African SWFs like the Libyan 
Investment Authority. De facto, Libyan investment in the region has soared over the past 
decade, funded by record oil prices, through the Libya Africa Portfolio for Investments 
(LAP), the USD 5 billion sovereign wealth fund. China also created in 2007 a China Africa 
Development Fund with USD 5 billion to invest in the continent. The Qatar Investment 
Authority has announced that it has created a new investment fund, PME Infrastructure 
Management Limited Fund, with USD 400 million assets, to invest in African transportation, 
communication and energy sectors. This fund was announced on the eve of a trip by South 
African President Thabo Mbeki to Qatar that took place in 2008. 
 
Secondly, and maybe more importantly, the most experienced and sophisticated sovereign 
funds, those from the Middle East and South East Asia in particular, have accumulated a 
deep knowledge of setting up and developing such funds and managing national wealth. 
Each national context is specific, with differing objectives from one country to another, but 
all share similar capacity constraints, asset allocation priorities and strategies. Which 
investment benchmarks should they use? Which risk adjusted investment should be 
targeted and which investment strategies and portfolio breakdown should be pursued? 
What products, sectors or countries are most/least correlated with their own economy? On 
top of that how is one to organize the management of a nation’s wealth? Should it be 
delegated to a specific institution or established within the already installed capacity of 
Central Banks or Ministries of Finance?  
 
The above questions underline the great potential for fruitful exchange and mutual learning. 
The OECD is above all known and regarded for its unique peer review and learning process 
developed over five decades’ experience. Such a peer review and peer learning could also 
be highly beneficial to sovereign funds. An informal institution, a Sovereign Wealth Network 
(SovNet), could be envisaged to provide a forum for such funds to exchange experiences 
and learn from each others’ successes and difficulties. The most experienced and 
sophisticated might share their experiences with countries in the process of planning or 
establishing their own national funds. More established SWFs from Gulf countries, Malaysia 
or Singapore would have precious experiences to share with African or Central Asian 
countries for instance. Nigeria, Thailand, Brazil and India (all of them planning such 
institutions), but also China and Russia (both already with SWF institutions in the making) 
could learn from the difficulties or successes of their peers in Kuwait, Dubai or Kuala 
Lumpur. Such a platform of dialogue does not exist per se. Mongolia, contemplating 
creating a sovereign fund to manage its rich mineral wealth, could learn from other 
experiences. The same applies for Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Central Asian or most of the 
African countries that are planning to set up such institutions or that are struggling with the 
management of an already existing fund.  
 
This could lead to informal and formal cooperation or even to joint investments and 
developments. Training and transfer of technology and knowledge could be also included, 
the demand from newly created SWF being to develop internal capacity with people that 
can manage increasing share of new mandates. Frequently, one of the requests of SWFs 
when they agree mandates with external fund managers is precisely to provide training for 
employees. 
 
Some cooperation among SWFs already exists. Norway’s SWF has been very active in 
providing expertise to countries in need of wealth management capacity building. Some 
other SWFs from developed countries have been also engaged in international technological 






of helping the Democratic Republic of Sao Tomé and Príncipe to set up its own wealth fund 
(Cowper, 2008). Norway, through its Oil for development initiative, also helped Sao Tomé in 
2005, both in terms of financial management and technical expertise. The authorities of 
East Timor (The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste) have been also helped by Norway in 
the process of establishing a petroleum management system. When the National Oil Fund 
of Kazakhstan was established in the year 2000, the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank studied previous SWFs experiences, especially the Alaska Permanent Fund, the Alberta 
Heritage Fund and the Norwegian Government Pension Fund (formerly the Petroleum 
Fund). In the end, Norway was used as a model for setting the Kazakh SWF (Sartbayev and 
Izbasarov, 2008). 
 
But even more revealing has been the development of south-south agreements. The 
Vietnamese State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) and Qatar Investment Authority, 
for example, set an agreement in 2008 to create a USD 1 billion investment fund to invest 
in Vietnamese companies. Qatar’s SWF has been very active in its investments and 
cooperation with Asian countries. Another Gulf based SWF, Oman’s State General Reserve 
Fund, set up a USD 100mil investment fund with Vietnam’s SCIC. Also in 2008, gas 
exporters Qatar and Indonesia set up a USD 1 billion fund to invest in energy and 
infrastructure. Barwa Real Estate Company, an affiliate of the Qatar Investment Authority's 
USD 40 billion property wing, agreed a USD 2 billion deal with state-owned Libyan 
Development and Investment Company to develop leisure, commercial and residential. 
Within the Gulf examples abound, like for example the recent joint venture between the 
Qatar Investment Authority and the International Petroleum Investment Company, a 
subsidiary of the Abu Dhabi Investment Council, which agreed in 2008, to create a USD 2 
billion fund for global acquisitions. In June 2008, Libya and Qatar stroke a sovereign fund 
deal, the agreement being on setting up and regulating an investment fund between Qatar 
Investment Authority (QIA) and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). 
 
The most sophisticated SWFs with the greatest human resources could therefore develop 
cooperation arms to advise their peers in the management of sovereign wealth, engage in 
knowledge transfer and capacity building. They would have a direct interest in doing so, 
some of them being able to manage mandates for other institutions. But beyond this 
potential direct business such an engagement would above all raise such funds’ 
international profile and bring them to become key interlocutors in the international finance 
arena. Interestingly, some SWF have already set up offices of public affairs and 
international cooperation that could handle such activities. This is the case, for example, of 
the Chinese Investment Corporation (CIC) (see Wang, 2008)12, who hired a former World 
Bank officer to take the position or of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) who also 
has a director for international affairs in charge of dealing with international organizations, 
like the IMF or the European Commission, as well as with governments (also in mid 2008 
ADIA brought in the former head of corporate communications at Morgan Stanley, as global 
head of corporate communications and public affairs).  
 
The scope of the mandates of such international offices could go however well beyond a 
public relations exercise with international organizations and help to stimulate more 
investment towards other developing and emerging countries (as in the case of Temasek’s 
international director appointed in 2008), as providing also macroeconomic coverage for the 
firm, such double mandate being frequently the one of chief economist and international 
directors of more classical financial institutions like banks. When such international offices 
or relations activities exist they tend however to be narrowly defined and mostly limited to 
deal with international organizations like the IMF or the World Bank or Western officials 
when they visit the country, like in the case for example of the State Oil Fund of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, a small SWF with USD 5 billion of assets under management in 2008 
but who has developed such international relations. 
 
                                                 






Although the IMF set out an International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) 
in 2007 to elaborate a set of SWF principles properly reflecting their investment practices 
and objectives13, there is no south-south peer review or peer learning driven institution. The 
OECD Development Centre created in 2006 a similar informal, closed and restricted 
platform of dialogue between OECD and emerging multinationals, the Emerging Markets 
Network (EmNet). A companion of this platform of dialogue could be replicated for 
sovereign wealth funds, from both OECD and emerging countries, including also other 
emerging and developing countries that have commodity endowments or wealth 
management issues. This Sovereign Wealth Network (SovNet) would be a unique platform 
for peer review and peer-learning for and largely by developing and emerging countries.  
 
Such a platform would also be a unique space of dialogue and interaction with regional 
development banks, particularly the ones based in emerging and developing countries that 
are becoming important actors of development14. In Latin America, the Andean based 
Corporación Andina de Fomento or the Brazilian development bank BNDES have operations 
that already match or surpass the ones that Washington based institutions such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank or the World Bank dedicate to the region. Similarly, as 
already suggested, such platform could also facilitate the dialogue with OECD based 
bilateral development banks involved in private or public private equity deals in frontier 
emerging markets, particularly the Scandinavian ones or the others like FMO from the 
Netherlands or CDCD Group from UK. 
 
 
                                                 
13 See http://www.iwg-swf.org/. See also IMF, Sovereign wealth funds: a work agenda, Washington, DC, 
IMF, 2008. 
14 In a recent paper Griffith-Jones and Ocampo suggest another type of linkage between SWFs and 
regional development Banks, the former providing additional funding to the later (Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo, 2008). Here we are more thinking about potential joint ventures as the ones already in the 









Sovereign wealth funds are the products of a major global economic and financial 
rebalancing of power. Their emergence has been controversial not only because of the fear 
of politically induced investments, lack of transparency and other conspiratorial 
arguments15, but also because they symbolize a much deeper phenomenon reshaping the 
world’s economy and finance. Emerging markets are taking an unusual lead, becoming, 
among other things, massive creditors to the world and to industrialized countries in 
particular. Since the early 2000s, the emerging world as a whole is for the first time running 
current account surpluses and exporting capital to the rest of the world. Emerging countries 
are now key engines and actors of the world economy. 
 
When the OECD was created five decades ago, it concentrated nearly 75 per cent of world 
GDP. Now it represents a mere 55%. Takeovers by emerging Middle Eastern, Asian or Latin 
American multinationals are taking place all around the world. The novelty lies this time not 
only in the size of the takeovers but also in the fact that the bulk of their targets are now 
OECD multinationals. In 2007 an emerging multinational (PetroChina) became, for the first 
time, the major capitalization in the world, surpassing traditional US titans like Exxon or 
General Electric. Among the 11 biggest listed companies in the world, 6 are now from 
emerging markets, with China leading the race along with Russia and Brazil.  
 
The emergence of SWF should therefore be put into this broader perspective: for the first 
time financial actors from developing countries are playing with other OECD financial giants 
as equals. The novelty is that the new global financial players are no longer headquartered 
in The City of London, or in the Boston or New York financial districts but rather in more 
exotic places like Beijing, Singapore or Dubai.  
 
This emergence of SWF investors in developing countries is a chance for those developing 
countries where SWFs are seeking to invest. It is also an opportunity for the international 
community to engage in a positive dialogue over two key dimensions. One is between 
OECD and emerging countries that are hosting or planning to develop SWF institutions or 
have more generally wealth management issues to deal with. Here we could envisage 
cooperation between development finance institutions, both bilateral and multilateral, and 
these rising actors. More generally, OECD countries should plug more money and resources 
in helping wealth management capacity in developing countries that badly need them: if we 
consider, as mentioned previously, that the potential cost for a non performing asset 
allocation of the wealth of these nations can reach USD 100 billion, an amount equivalent to 
all annual ODA from OECD countries, this is a major issue. Countries like Norway, which is 
both resource rich and has its own SWF and extensive experience in technology transfer 
and capacity building related to oil, are already active in this field. But we could imagine 
that others, either through their cooperation, finance ministries or their own SWF, enter 
also in this dynamic, as we suggest for example for Chile (Havro and Santiso, 2008). 
 
In this exercise of wealth management cooperation and capacity building, SWFs from 
emerging and developing countries can also be active and key actors. They could work to 
                                                 
15 It is however ironic to see Western capitals pledging for more transparency from SWF (targeting 
mostly the ones in emerging and developing country) in the midst of the subprime crisis, due precisely to 
the lack of transparency in all the Western financial system. Another complication lies also in the fact 
that even if SWFs agree to the strip tease requested by Westerners we will quickly encounter another 
difficulty: what about the private equity, hedge fund and other investment companies, based mostly in 
Western financial centres, that receive mandates from SWF? A SWF like Norway declared to have 
mandates allocated to 50 external fund managers for about 22% of the assets of the fund, by the end of 
2006 (data from Kjaer, 2008). If we take this ratio as a reasonable minimalist assumption we can easily 
see that the sums are nearly equivalent to one third of all the SWFs assets: according to a Cerulli 
Associates report, sovereign wealth funds have an estimated USD 1.3 trillion already in play with external 
managers, that amounts to about 44% of the total of SWFs assets. Some SWF from emerging countries 
have already ratios that are higher: in the case of Kazakhstan, 46% of the assets of the national Oil Fund 






transfer their own knowledge and technologies or, more simply, share with other 
developing countries that are caught in wealth management capacity traps or planning to 
develop institutions to deal with their resource wealth. In this regards, we propose to create 
an informal platform of peer review and peer learning between SWF and developing 
countries with similar issues, a SovNet (Sovereign Wealth Network) based on the same 
dynamics and characteristics that the one we developed at the OECD Development Centre 
for OECD and emerging multinationals, the Emerging Markets Network (EmNet). Such a 
platform would be unique, driven by sovereign funds themselves promoting south-south 
cooperation (with also OECD SWFs also involved), the Development Centre offering 













UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 250 875
Norway Government Pension Fund-Global 380 380
Saudi Arabia 1/ No designated name 289 289
Kuwait Reserve Fund / Government Reserve Fund 213 213
Russia Reserve Fund 125 125
National Welfare Fund 32 32
Libya Libyan Investment Corporation 50 50
Qatar State Reserve Fund/Stabilization fund 30 50
Algeria Reserve Fund/Revenue Regulation Fund 43 43
USA (Alaska) Alaska Permanent Reserve Fund 40 40
Brunei Brunei Investment Authority 30 30
Kazakhstan National Fund 21 21
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional BHD 19 19
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 16 16
Nigeria Excess Crude Account 11 11
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund 9 9
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 2.5 2.5
Oman State General Reserve Fund 2.2 2
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund of Timor-Leste 1.4 1.4
Venezuela FIEM - Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 0.8 0.8
Trinidad & Tobago Revenue Stabilization Fund 0.5 0.5
Singapore Government Investment Corp. 100 330
China China Investment Corporation 200 200
Singapore Temasek Holdings 108 108
Korea Korea Investment Corp. 30 30
Taiwan, Province of China National Stabilisation Fund 15 15
Australia Australian Future Fund 54 54
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 14.9 14.9
Pension Reserve Fund 1.5 1.5
Botswana 1/ Pula Fund 4.7 4.7
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Fund 0.4 0.4
Total 2,093 2,968
Source: IMF (2008) based on Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Peterson IIE, PIMCO, SWF websites and press.
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